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Abstract
This article discusses Richard Kearney’s proposed resolution to the recent debate between Claude Lanzmann, director of Shoah,
and Steven Spielberg, concerning mimesis and Schindler’s List. Kearney advocates finding an Aristotelian mean between the
uniqueness and communicability in stories involving the Shoah, stressing the importance of empathy in the narrative process.
This article agrees with Kearney, but stresses the difficulties in finding such a mean, using such writers on the Holocaust as Jean
Amery, Elie Wiesel, and Lawrence Langer as evidence. This paper especially deals with pop culture movies that privilege
empathy at the cost of obscuring the horror of the events, and analyses Schindler’s List and Life is Beautiful as two such movies.
The essential thrust of this paper is the discussion of the precariousness of such an Aristotelian mean, of bearing in mind the
micro-narratives while still preserving the magnitude of the horror of the events of the Shoah.

Introduction
It is now over fifty years since the events of the Shoah were perpetrated. Its dark legacy has made a profound impact upon the
imagination of the world, visible through the many monuments and museums dedicated to the memory of those murdered by
Nazi Germany. Several prominent figures in the intellectual sphere of our day survived the death camps and serve as living
reminders of the legacy of National Socialism. Aside from such impact on academic spheres, the Holocaust has impressed itself
on the landscape of popular culture, perhaps most notably in the field of cinema. Such films as Life is Beautiful and Schindler’s
List, representing events concerning the Nazi regime and the destruction of European Jewry, were by and large both highly
regarded by film critics, and also commercially successful. And yet, I worry. I worry that this preoccupation with the Holocaust
in popular culture, especially in film, obscures our view of the depths of its hellish abyss. I worry that these films obscure the
horror of the events so as to enable us to resume our lives as if nothing of extraordinary significance transpired during the
Shoah.
In this essay, I will examine the importance and difficulty inherent to the telling and retelling of narratives related to the Shoah.
I will begin by discussing the ethical importance of narrative retellings of historical events and personages in general, and why
these testimonial narratives are particularly important in regards to historical injustices and atrocities. Once the importance of
such narratives is established, I will explore some difficulties relating to this task, through the extreme case of the Shoah. I will
do this through briefly examining a current debate surrounding the presentation of stories about the Shoah, and I will discuss
one possible resolution to this debate. Next, through the insights of various writers, I will explore the difficulties of the
proposed resolution to underscore the precariousness (if not impossibility) of the task of adequately representing the Shoah.
Then, I will examine and evaluate Life is Beautiful and Schindler’s List as fictional or quasi-fictional narrative retellings of the
Shoah, so as to reveal a serious danger present in narrative retellings of those events. Finally, I will reflect once more upon the
proposed resolution to this difficult problem and the danger present in narrative retellings in hope of reaching a better
understanding of what is at stake in the situation regarding narrative retellings of the Shoah in popular culture.

The Importance of Testimonial Narrative
Many philosophers, both past and present (including Kant and Aristotle1) have stressed the importance of narratives and
narrative understanding for practical/ethical concerns. In this essay, I will be focusing on testimonial narratives,
those narratives that tell stories about people and events of the past. Before I can discuss the importance of testimonial
narratives concerning atrocities, I must first briefly examine two functions of testimonial narrative that relate to ethical
phronesis in general: first, how testimonial narrative illustrates the enactment of ethical virtues in the real world, and second,
how testimonial narrative opens the subject to the other.2

The first ethically significant function of narrative concerns its ability to educate people about how to incorporate ethical
maxims into their real-world lives. While ethical philosophies often espouse abstract precepts, narratives furnish people with
examples of what these precepts might look like employed in real life, and how to go about enacting them. We learn from
these stories and incorporate the knowledge into our own lives. For example, a philosopher might stress the importance of
being courageous, but we would look to the story of Achilles to understand what courage means.3
The second ethical function of testimonial narrative concerns our openness to the other. Our narrative imagination, which is
the source of both ethics and poetics, can propel us beyond our own narcissism into genuine relations with the other. Narrative
brings us into the world of other people. That is, the process of narrative enables us to suspend our own lives temporarily so as
to take part in the struggles, emotions and dilemmas of others. Richard Kearney writes that the narrative imagination:
is ethical to the extent that it suffers the other to be other while suffering with
(com-patire) the other as other. Its power of reception becomes compassion. The
ethical imagination allows the other to exist ‘without why’ – not for my sake, or
because it conforms to my scheme of things, but for its own sake.4

In narrative re-enactment, there is a mixing of the Same and the Other.5 What happens in narrative retellings of events, is that
part of the Other is brought into the Same, through the narrative function of figuring as. What this means is that through the
‘hermeneutic act of transfer by analogy’6 we can experience past events and foreign worlds by refiguring them so as to be
somewhat similar or analogous to our present experience. Without this similarity there could be no identifying or recognition in
the Other-landscape outside our Same. Of course, it is very important to remember that in this process of ‘othering’ the Same,
we must realize that there are differences, that the past is not wholly brought within the Same, that it remains ultimately
different, and that we must respect these differences. However, we are given at least a partial picture of the world of the other,
which enables us to see the sanctity of the existence of the other, which helps us become aware of our obligations to the
other.7
This ethical obligation to the other does not just hold for the living other, but for the dead as well. Thus, it is our ethical
responsibility to tell and retell the narratives of the victims of history, those whom history has prevented from telling their own
stories. Elie Weisel, a writer who survived Auschwitz, states, ‘I owe the dead my memory. I am duty-bound to serve as their
emissary, transmitting the history of their disappearance, even if it disturbs, even if it brings pain. Not to do so would be to
betray them.’8
This ethical phronesis imparted by testimonial narratives, especially as it relates to narratives concerning atrocities, allows us to
meet two important ethical obligations. In enabling us to move beyond our ‘now’, our Same, both temporally and subjectively
(that is to the degree that we can take into account the other), we can meet our ethical debt (if only partially) to the memory of
the dead by remembering their stories, and better meet our ethical obligations to those living in the present and the future.
By recalling and retelling the stories of the Shoah, and of the victims of the event, we can enter into a discourse of sorts with
the others of the past who were victimised and ultimately silenced, and thus by resuscitating their voices (by however small a
degree) we can begin to answer our ethical debt to the dead. Paul Ricoeur writes:
By remembering and telling, we not only prevent forgetfulness from killing the
victims twice; we also prevent their life-stories from becoming banal…[by being
explained away through master narratives]…and the events from appearing as
necessary.9

Our responsibility to remember their stories is compounded by the fact that the world has already failed these people twice: by
neglecting to act on their behalf both during the Holocaust and afterwards, both when their lives could have still been saved
and when those responsible were never forced to answer for their involvement.10
Through the sympathetic engagement with the stories of these victimized others of the past, we are able to look to the present
and future and attempt to safeguard humanity from allowing such events to transpire again. While nothing
can undo the monstrous injustices of the past, we can become conscious of them. By doing so, we can meet our ethical
obligation to the present and future by seeking to prevent such evil from taking place again. Rabbi Irving Greenberg expresses

this in terms of a combination of the sentiment of lament over our inability to help the dead, coupled with the ethical
imperative to battle injustice (coming out of the Shoah) when he says:
To talk of love and of a God who cares in the presence of the burning children
[the children who were burned alive in Auschwitz] is obscene; to leap in and pull
a child out of a pit, to clean its face and heal its body, is to make a most powerful
statement – the only statement that counts.11

Thus, however problematic the stories of the Shoah render traditional views of theology and philosophy, and however difficult
it is to conceive of theoretical responses to them, there is one immediate authentic response we can, and are
obligated to, make. That is, we must combat injustice through preventing similar events from transpiring. By recounting the
stories of the Shoah, and sharing in the pain of the victims, a great impetus to fight injustice everywhere is imparted to us,
which bolsters our motivation for meeting our ethical obligation to others in the
present and the future.

Difficulties of Narrating Stories about the Holocaust
If we see the ethical importance of remembering and retelling stories of the Holocaust, then we are presented with a very
serious problem. Given the tremendous nature of the evil and unjust suffering present in the Holocaust, how do we go about
telling and retelling stories of its events? Can we treat a story about the Holocaust like any other story?
Firstly, how do narratives work? Aristotle pointed out that there are cathartic and poetic (from poiesis) functions taking place in
the mimesis of the narrative. Through the cathartic function of the narrative, the audience is able to sympathise with the
characters of the story, while simultaneously maintaining an air of distance. One engages in the story as if it were real, but one
also knows that it is ‘just a story.’ We, the audience, receive a purgation of emotion through our participation in the story,
because of the dialectic of attachment to and distance from characters of the
story. This ‘empathic detachment’ is made possible through the fact that narrative operates as poiesis: the disclosure of the
hidden causes of one’s actions. Thus, the audience of a narrative has a privileged view of the events of the story, both involved
and yet detached from its unfolding events.12
Many prominent thinkers and writers who deal with the Holocaust, as well as many survivors, have expressed the difficulty of
any substantial sort of empathy with, much less any catharsis through, stories relating the horrors of the Shoah for those who
were not there. The reason for this is that the world of the Shoah differs entirely from the world we know. In the Kingdom of
Night, there was no redemption or clarity, only horror that seems impossible in its extent. Thus, essentially, it is impossible to
share in the stories of the victims through a narrative figuring as. It is especially immoral, according to people holding this
position, to try to retell stories of the Holocaust hoping for some salvific or healing result. One of the most acclaimed movies
about the Holocaust, Shoah, specifically does not use any of the
above mentioned narrative structures. Claude Lanzmann, the film’s director, feels that the Holocaust is too immense and
horrible to be communicated about directly, through some sort of mimesis. Any mimesis of the events would only betray the
truth rather than illuminate it. Instead Lanzmann includes nine and a half hours of interviews with survivors, witnesses and
perpetrators. Saul Friedlander points out that in Shoah, ‘Reality is there, in its starkness, but perceived through a filter: that of
memory (distance in time), that of spatial displacement, that of some sort of narrative margin which leaves the unsayable
unsaid.’13 Lanzmann, who sees his position as the only ethical one, sharply criticised Spielberg’s film Schindler’s List for
attempting a mimesis of a story relating to the events of the Shoah.
Richard Kearney, in various articles and books, has discussed the debate concerning Claude Lanzmann, his ally, the postmodern
philosopher Lyotard, and Stephen Spielberg. Against Lanzmann’s approach, which testifies to the
unrepresentability, the untellability, of the events, Kearney stresses the merit of Spielberg’s attempt to retell some of the
events of the Holocaust using a method that employs the cathartic and poetic functions of narrative. Kearney writes:
certain injustices appeal to narrative imagination to plead their case lest they slip
irrevocably into oblivion. Ethical experiences of good and evil need to be felt
upon the pulse of shared emotions. The horrible must strike the audience as
horrible. It must provoke us to identify and empathize with the victims. And this
requires an act of moral – because morally outraged and scandalized –

imagining.14

What Lanzmann and Lyotard fail to see, Kearney argues, is that an essential factor in the power of narrative is empathy. It is not
sufficient to evoke the horror of the events in a purely indirect manner, as Lanzmann does through interviews with survivors
and perpetrators, but that more people will be reached, and reached more deeply, if they are made to feel and experience the
suffering and horror as if they were present at the events. We need to ‘rememorate’ the victims and their stories, and these
stories cannot be remembered adequately without being felt. Kearney argues
that just as Lyotard and Lanzmann see themselves as ethically motivated, so too is Spielberg. Citing Kantian ‘representative
thinking,’ Kearney stresses the need for people to be able to identify with as many fellow humans as possible, even those of
different times and places. Kearney sees the solution in some sort of Aristotelian
mean between the two rival parties. He argues:
…a practical wisdom (phronesis) of historical narrative requires in this age of
easy forgetfulness…a proper balance between the dual fidelities of memory to
the uniqueness and communicability of past events.15

While I am inclined to agree with Kearney’s general position, I find it necessary to stress the difficulty (even, perhaps, the
impossibility) present in finding such an Aristotelian mean with regards to narratives told about the Holocaust. While I respect
Kearney’s position concerning the importance of empathy, and the experiencing as in the narrative process, one must also
remember the arguments of survivors such as Jean Amery and Elie Wiesel, who stress the impossibility of communicating the
experience of the Shoah. Even Lawrence Langer, who is certainly more optimistic of our (we who were not there) ability to
empathise than either Amery or Wiesel, stresses the immense obstacles present to any such empathy.
Jean Amery wrote that, while the Holocaust may have become the existential reference point for all Jews today, only those who
were sacrificed to the Nazi ‘logic of destruction’ can truly understand its horrors. This ‘sad privilege’ is reserved for Amery and
his fellow survivors. One who was not present is encouraged to empathise and imagine the horrors of the Shoah, but regardless
of how noble one’s intentions may be, and how much effort one supplies to the task, the person will ‘still sound like a blind man
talking about color.’16 With truly chilling clarity, Amery describes the event of his being suspended by a meat-hook and tortured
by the SS (an experience which forever deprived him of trust in the world), before being sent to Auschwitz and having his entire
self (including any metaphysical notion or
abstract potentiality or possibility) reduced to his starving and battered body in the death camp. With no great pride, he
maintains that these events irrevocably separate him from those with no comparable experience.
Elie Wiesel often speaks of the contradiction of being obligated to tell the story of the victims, thus keeping alive their memory,
while convinced of his inability to convey the level of the Shoah’s immensity. Wiesel writes:
We [the survivors] all knew that we could never say what had to be said, that we
could never express in words – coherent, intelligible words – our experience of
madness on an absolute scale. The walk through fiery nights, the silence before
and after the selection, the toneless praying of the condemned, the Kaddish of
the dying, the fear and hunger of the sick, the shame and suffering, the haunted
eyes, the wild stares – I thought that I would never be able to speak of them. All
words seemed inadequate, worn, foolish, lifeless, whereas I wanted them to
sear.17

Wiesel, feeling that the truth is more fantastic and hellish than any possible fiction, staunchly opposes any fictional retelling of
the Holocaust. In an article entitled ‘Trivializing Memory’, Wiesel attacks the ‘merchants of images and the brokers of language’
who profess to speak for the victims.18 Rather than fiction, Wiesel argues that the Holocaust should be studied via non-fiction
texts and films. One should read the works of historians like Raul Hilberg, read the diaries of people such as Emanuel
Ringelbaum or Chaim Kaplan, read the poetry of children written in the
camps, or see non-fiction documentaries like Lanzmann’s Shoah.19
Lawrence Langer, whose superb work The Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory explores the traumas revealed in
survivor testimony (especially oral testimony), argues that it is not so much the case that the events of the Holocaust are
inherently incommunicable, but rather it is our traditional Western mindset, with its perspectives and values, that impairs our

vision when looking at the events of the Shoah. For example, Langer argues that our notion of heroism, and our traditional view
that one is always an agent in control of how one responds to one’s fate, prevent us from looking accurately at the actual
events.20 These preconceived notions cause us to impose our own constructs on the reality spoken of by the survivors, or to
turn away, saying that it is too horrible to imagine. For example, Langer recounts the tale of how, during an interview with a
survivor named Hannah F., the interviewers refused to hear the dark content of her testimony. When Hannah F. repeatedly
asserted that she survived out of ‘stupidity’ and ‘dumb luck,’ her interviewers continued to assert that she survived out of an
indomitable will to live, a deep inner strength.21 We are so tied into the Western tradition of narratives that centre around the
active agent in control of her destiny, or at least how she responds to it, that we fail to see how the Holocaust deprived almost
all of its victims of any choice regarding their fate. When speaking of an incident where prisoners were reduced by hunger to
the point of cannabalising a severed hand, Langer writes: ‘We lack the terms of discourse for such human situations, preferring
to call them inhuman and thus banish them from civilized consciousness.’22
I think Amery, Wiesel and Langer would all agree that a major reason for the difficulty in representing the events of the Shoah is
that its nature is so extreme, so paradigm shattering, that the reality becomes more fantastic and hellish than fiction, that what
is revealed casts much of what we understand as reality into question. Many survivors have even expressed disbelief at the
events they witnessed transpire. Thus the question of how one tells a story about the Holocaust necessarily invokes
consideration of mimesis, catharsis and poiesis. Whether in literature or film, how does one go about presenting stories of such
events? Did Wiesel’s Night transgress a boundary by giving us a central character who we can empathise with and follow?
Would the depiction of violence and death approximating the level then and there lose effectiveness in regards to the audience,
because the level of destruction goes beyond our ability to empathise, therefore trivialising the events?
Geoffrey Hartman, in his essay, ‘The Book of Destruction’ explores this theme, and others, in great depth. He reminds us of
Voltaire’s censure of a certain line in Shakespeare’s Macbeth for not being elevated enough for tragedy. Such a line, Voltaire
argued, would have an alienating effect on the audience and among other things would diminish the play. While Hartman is not
suggesting a reversion to enlightenment values, he does see wisdom in maintaining such limits of representation. When there
are no limits to representation, there remain limits to
our ability to conceptualise [and there are no limits to representation today for two reasons: 1) the current state of technology
allows for a complete mimesis of anything, and 2) that today artists and writers have a nearly unlimited freedom of expression].
When examining the Shoah, ‘We rediscover Aristotle’s criterion of probability. That the truth can offend probability is the
dilemma of the artist who must follow that truth without renouncing art.’23
The dilemma, as I see it, is how to preserve the human element in the immensity of the tragedy, and yet to stay true to history.
It comes back to the question of Kearney’s Aristotelian mean. How do you allow the audience to empathise with the victims, as
sympathetic human beings with lives that were so horribly interrupted, while depicting the magnitude of the evil perpetrated
against them? We can get a better understanding of this mean if we look at some notable contemporary films dealing with the
Holocaust, and examining where they fall short of this ideal position.
If we are to hold such a theoretical standard, (which I am not convinced is attainable) Lanzmann’s film Shoah falls short in
focusing exclusively on the evil and the incommunicable nature surrounding the events of the implementation of the ‘final
solution’, rather than tracing the human elements of the victims. Of course, Lanzmann would regard our ideal as impossible,
and see his own film, which is arguably the best about the Holocaust to date, as focusing on the need to recall our own
forgetfulness. The survivors interviewed are not asked about their lives before or after the war. When they tell their
experiences, it is to give voice to the voiceless dead, to bring to light what happened. While I would certainly argue that Shoah
is an extremely important and well-made film, I would also agree with Kearney’s
reservations about it. As horrifying as the stories being told by witnesses in the film are, there is a sense of detachment from
them. This comes largely from not being allowed to empathise with, to share in the pain (however partially) of the victims,
which we are confronted with only indirectly, through memory.
The majority of the movies made about the Holocaust, those designed primarily for the popular culture,24 err in the opposite
respect to Shoah. These films focus so much on the human level that they obscure the horror of the large-scale events. We
must bear in mind that the film-makers of popular movies, as opposed to Shoah and perhaps a handful of other documentaries,
are not always concerned with being true to the magnitude of the horror. They are often more interested in the little narratives
of their characters, which they can embellish to make the stories more optimistic, than in the horrors of the extermination. Two
examples of such films are Life is Beautiful and Schindler’s List.

I find the failure of this latter class of films in terms of the ideal mean to be far more troubling than the former, because when
these films fail they do so in ways that obscure the immensity of the horror. The heart of the problem, I believe, lies not with
the micro-narrative itself. It lies in the film-makers’ manipulation of these small narratives in order to help society cope (in ways
I consider to be inauthentic) with the horror of the macro-narrative of history and, more generally, with our society, which is all
too eager to promote such tales of hope and triumph of the human spirit. Whereas Lanzmann is thoroughly dedicated to
remembering the events in all their horror and magnitude, films such as Life is Beautiful and Schindler’s List, to differing degrees
and in different ways, ameliorate the events they represent, thus making it easier for the audience to come to grips with the
existential horrors and problems raised then and there, so that in a certain sense they are a form of forgetting.

Life is Beautiful
Of the two movies mentioned above, Life is Beautiful is the more guilty of obscuring memory. It ignores the reality of the
concentration camps to affirm the power of love, testifying first and last as to how love can overcome all obstacles.
Unfortunately, as the Holocaust makes all too painfully clear, the truth is the contrary; at times events can and do conquer
everything we regard as sacred, even love.
What this movie fails to take into consideration are the ways in which people were deprived of any sort of agency, and placed
in the terrible predicament of being reduced to what Langer refers to as ‘choiceless choice.’ There was no free choice for the
victims of the Shoah, and when people acted as if they had some sort of control over their destiny, at least how they met it,
disaster ensued. One positively horrifying example of such an event is recounted in the testimony of a survivor. She tells of how
she witnessed a Jewish father’s attempt to rescue his son, an infant, who was being held in the hospital where she worked. The
man was caught by a guard, who then proceeded to crush the baby’s skull against a brick wall.25 Langer stresses how commonly
the theme of disaster following the attempt to take control of one’s destiny appears in survivor testimony. Couple this lack of
control with the demoralising effects of starvation, savage and sadistic guards, the ubiquity of death and unprecedented
suffering, and the brutal hierarchy among the prisoners (where the Jews were at the absolute bottom), and we can begin to
understand the absurdity of this film. That a man could keep his child hidden and safe is ridiculous enough (as evinced by
Langer’s example above), but to remain a loving father who is able to hide the evil from his child is simply untenable.
And yet, perhaps such a trespass on history is not surprising. In an article titled ‘The Americanization of the Holocaust’, which
was, incidentally, written well before this movie, Langer points out the inability of traditional (as in Western tradition)
sensibilities and expectations to grasp the situation of the Holocaust. As an audience, we have had the notion of the agent, of
the person in control of her responses to situations in which she finds herself, inculcated into us. Even in the Greek tragedies
the hero was always given choice, even if that choice was only to die with dignity. Stories about the Holocaust, which
necessarily involve the loss of agency, fall outside of this tradition’s way of understanding the world.

Schindler’s List
Schindler’s List is a far superior film to Life is Beautiful, in terms of retelling the events of the Holocaust. And yet, dark as the
picture this movie paints is, it still obscures the reality.
Spielberg, to his credit, effectively steers clear of many of the dangers to which Life is Beautiful succumbs. He deprives the
audience of all security with regard to the state of the well-being of the Jewish characters in the film. By focusing the film
around Schindler, a German who becomes increasingly sympathetic to the Jewish plight, and by putting the Jewish prisoners in
roles where they are deprived of agency, Spielberg enables the audience to empathise with the story; while simultaneously
showing the absolute precariousness of the well-being of the Jewish
prisoners. By graphically depicting the randomness and impulsiveness of murders which are extremely unsettling to watch,
Spielberg’s approach to the Jewish characters transports his audience to a world outside of traditional storytelling. Lawrence
Langer applauds Schindler’s List for conveying how the imprisoned victims were denuded of their agency, by showing how their
behaviour became environmentally determined.26 By weaving the narrative concerning the prisoners of the concentration
camps with the story of the secure character of Schindler and the
hope he promises for the victims, Spielberg prevents the audience from becoming numb to the horror.
While I regard Schindler’s List as a masterful work, one quite superior to Life is Beautiful, I do believe it falls short of our ideal
mean as well. In this film the horror of the Shoah is diminished in two respects: in Spielberg’s presentations of the position of

non-Jews regarding the Holocaust and in the movie’s scope. The first shortcoming of this movie is the way in which it often
avoids depicting the complicity of the non-Jewish world in the events of the Shoah. One commentator, Ilan Avisar, offers stern
criticism for Spielberg’s allowance of his political ‘sensitivity’ to stereotyping to interfere with showing anti-Semitism as a major
cause for the Holocaust. A major example of this inauthentic ‘sensitivity’ can be seen in the manner that Spielberg ‘balances’ his
portrayal of the Germans, pitting Schindler
(the good German) against Goeth (the evil German). Avisar is not surprised that this film received favourable reviews in
Germany, as it ‘diminishes the crucial role of the Germans in the Final Solution’.27
Lawrence Langer, who for the most part met the film with approbation, offers similar criticism. He points out the ‘deplorable’
scene where, as the war ends, Schindler tells the SS stationed at his factory that, instead of murdering all the prisoners before
the official end of the war at midnight, they could return home as decent people. Langer argues that this scene is indicative of
Spielberg recoiling from acknowledging the degree to which the Holocaust undermines the traditional Western views of human
nature and morality. Langer writes:
He [Spielberg] insists on pretending that decency is a salvageable virtue for those
so recently conspiring in mass murders, as if the lives of the Jews could suddenly
matter more to them than saving their own necks from swift Russian justice. 28

The second way in which Schindler’s List obscures the horror of the Shoah concerns its scope. As Avisar correctly points out,
Schindler’s List is based upon a marginal text of the Holocaust, and yet, Spielberg proceeds to ‘elevate it to central canonical
status.’29 As noble as the real Schindler was, and as important as it is to recall his heroic memory, one must bear in mind how
few Germans actually made any attempt to aid the Jews. This film is primarily centred on Schindler’s heroism rather than on the
extermination of the Jews. To illustrate this Avisar points to the scene where Schindler rescues Stern, the Jewish manager of his
business. Stern, who has been loaded aboard a cattle car by the Nazis to be sent to his death, is rescued by Schindler’s courage
and quick thinking. The camera then focuses on the two men walking away, rather than on the thousands of other innocent
people on the train heading to their certain death. By having almost all of the major secondary Jewish characters survive thanks
to Schindler’s heroism, the presence of the others who were not so fortunate is minimised.

Conclusion
I believe we now see the precariousness of an Aristotelian mean in relation to depicting the Holocaust. Perhaps the darkness of
the Kingdom of Night can only truly be comprehended by those who were there. Elie Wiesel has stated:
After the war every survivor was asked the same question by the dead: Will you
be able to tell our tale? Now we know the answer: no. Their tale cannot be told –
and never will be. Those who spoke were not heard; the story you heard was not
the story they told.30

One thing is certain, even if art and testimony can never adequately convey the depths of the Holocaust, it is nevertheless of
paramount ethical importance to keep trying.
However, in doing so we must not dilute the narratives to make the horror easier for the audience to bear, or flinch before
reality by disproportionately representing hope. To do so would be to trivialise the event and the suffering of the victims. We
owe it to the dead, and to the victims of the present and the potential victims of the future, to open ourselves to the suffering
of the victims of history. In the case of the Holocaust this means not stopping our eyes before the depths of its abyss. As painful
and shattering an experience as this is, we must not let the suffering of the victims fade into forgetfulness. This can happen
either through outright forgetfulness or through the narrative retellings of events from the Shoah filtered through the rosycoloured lenses of popular films that minimise the
suffering and evil so as to focus on the overwhelmingly small presence of hope and the triumph of the spirit.
In conclusion, I believe that Richard Kearney is essentially correct concerning his Aristotelian mean between the
incommunicability and the importance to empathise in regards to narratives of the Holocaust. However, it is vitally important
to remember the precariousness of such a mean. It is better to err on the side of truth than to trivialise the events, which can
ultimately lead to a sort of forgetfulness. Stories of the Holocaust should sear our very souls, bringing us to the brink of despair.
Anything less fails our obligation to the dead, and to victims of history in the present and the future.
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8

From ‘Why I Write’,p.16.

9

From “The Memory of Suffering”, p. 290.

10

As Jean Amery so powerfully and hauntingly points out in his essay ‘Resentments’, the criminal never really had to face the
‘truth of his atrocity’. p. 79.

11

From ‘Cloud of Smoke, Pillar of Fire’, p. 331.

12

From The Poetics.

13

From Introduction to Probing the Limits of Representation, p. 17.

14

From ‘Narrative Imagination – the Ethical Challenge’,p.253.

15

From ‘Narrative and the Ethics of Remembrance’, p. 31.

16

‘On the Necessity and Impossibility of Being a Jew’, p. 93.

17

From ‘Why I write’,p.15.

18

p. 166.

19

This is not to say that Wiesel would necessarily side with Lanzmann in the Spielberg/Lanzmann/Kearney debate in terms of
mimes is and empathy. Night by Wiesel is a narrative where one sympathises with a character and follows him

through a story. Wiesel, despite his claims to the impossibility of conveying the reality of the Shoah, makes use of
empathy and feeling as if in telling his story.
20

That is, the events as told by survivors.

21

The Holocaust Testimonies, p. 64.

22

p. 118.

23

p. 328.

24

Whereas the length and style of Shoah seems designed for intellectuals.

25

From Langer, The Holocaust Testimonies, p. 125.

26

From the Introduction of Admitting the Holocaust, p. 11.

27

From ‘Holocaust Movies and the Politics of Collective Memory’, p. 51.

28

From the Introduction of Admitting the Holocaust, p. 11.

29

From ‘Holocaust Movies and the Politics of Collective Memory’, p. 49.

30

‘Art and Culture After the Holocaust’, p. 404.
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